Free Online Library: Fish, William. Philosophy of Perception: A Contemporary Introduction.(Book review) by "The Review of Metaphysics"; Philosophy and. The philosophy of perception investigates the nature of our sensory experiences and their relation to reality. Raising questions about the conscious character of. Philosophy of Perception: A Contemporary Introduction. Fish provides us with a clearly written, informed, and accessible contemporary introduction to the.


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The Problem of Perception (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

In neither case can we infer that there exists something Vladimir is thinking about, or that there is exists something he is experiencing. This is the typical manifestation of intensionality.

  • Philosophy of Perception: A Contemporary Introduction by William Fish
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Anscombe regarded the error of sense-data and naive realist theories of perception as philosophy of perception fish failure to recognise this intensionality. Armstrong and Pitcher argued that perception is a form of belief.

More precisely, they argued that it is the acquisition of a belief, since an acquisition is a conscious event, as perceiving is; rather than a state or condition, as belief is.

Belief is an intentional state in the sense that it represents the world to be a certain way, and the way it represents the world to be is said to be its intentional content. Perception, it was argued, is similarly a representation of the world, and the way it represents the world to be is likewise philosophy of perception fish intentional content.

Philosophy of Perception: A Contemporary Introduction, 1st Edition (Paperback) - Routledge

The fact that someone can have a perceptual experience philosophy of perception fish a is F without there being any thing which is F was taken as a reason for saying that perception is just a form of belief-acquisition. Philosophy of perception fish belief theory of perception and related theories, like the judgement theory of Craig is a specific version of the intentional theory.

Everyone will agree that perception does give rise to beliefs about the environment. But this does not mean that perception is simply the acquisition of belief.

Philosophy of Perception : William Fish :

One can experience this even if one knows and therefore believes that the lines are the same length. If perception were simply the acquisition of belief, then this would be a case of explicitly contradictory beliefs: But this is surely not the right way to describe this situation.

The intentionalist theory is, however, not committed to the view that perceptual experience is belief; philosophy of perception fish can be a sui generis kind of intentional state or event see Martin —3.

Many intentionalists hold that the sameness of phenomenal character in perception and hallucination is exhausted or constituted by this sameness in content see TyeByrne But this latter claim is not essential to intentionalism see the discussion of intentionalism and qualia below.

What is essential is that the intentional content of perception philosophy of perception fish whether wholly or partly its phenomenal character.

What is perceptual content? A standard approach to intentionality treats all intentional states as propositional attitudes: The distinguishing feature of the propositional attitudes is that their content—how they represent the world to be—is something which is assessable as true or false.

Hence the canonical form of ascriptions of perceptual experiences is: Perception, on this kind of intentionalist view, is a propositional attitude see Philosophy of perception fish for a recent defence of this idea, see also Siegel But intentionalism is not committed to the view that perception is a propositional attitude.


For one thing, it is controversial whether all intentional states are propositional attitudes see Crane

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